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Abstract
We explore hold-up when trading parties can make speciﬁc investments
simultaneously or sequentially. With simultaneous investment both investors
are held-up. With sequential investment contracting becomes possible after the
project has commenced, so the second investor avoids being held-up. If the two
investments are independent three eﬀects are identiﬁed when comparing the
total welfare of the two regimes: sequential investment increases the costs of
delay; sequential investment reduces the incentive for the ﬁrst player to invest;
and the sequential regime increases the second player’s incentive to invest.
Given this, the (second-best) optimal regime will favour the more important
investment. Similarly, if the choice of investment level of an investor is inelastic
to the regime adopted, the timing regime adopted should maximise the incentive
for the other party to invest. The paper also shows the timing of investment
can act as an additional form of hold-up; if they have the option when to invest,
a party may choose the regime that does not maximise total welfare.
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11 Introduction
It has been shown by Grout (1984) and Hart (1995), amongst others, that parties
may not make eﬃcient speciﬁc investments when contracts are incomplete.1 These
incomplete contract models typically have the following structure: the trading parties
simultaneously make their investments that are sunk and, at least partially, speciﬁc;
after these investments are made contracting on some relevant variable becomes pos-
sible; at this point the parties renegotiate and trade occurs according to the renegoti-
ated contract. If, because of renegotiation, a party does not receive the full marginal
return from their eﬀort, investment will be ineﬃcient.2
An alternative literature has considered how the hold-up problem can be over-
come by allowing parties to stagger or sequence their investments. For example,
Neher (1999) considered staged ﬁnancing of a project when an entrepreneur is unable
to commit not to renege on their contract with the ﬁnancier. When the project is
ﬁnanced in stages, as the project matures, the alienable (contractible) element of the
project, manifested in the accumulated physical assets, provides a better bargaining
position during renegotiation for the ﬁnancier in the event of default. As a conse-
quence, the entrepreneur has less incentive to renege. De Fraja (1999) considered the
Stackelberg-type sequencing of investments in the presence of hold-up. De Fraja’s
solution to the hold-up problem required the ﬁrst party to make a general investment
then make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the other party that included him paying for
1Also see Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988).
2It has also been noted that the level of general investments can be eﬀected in the presence of
incomplete contracts: Malcomson (1997) noted that hold-up of general investment can occur when
there are turnover costs.
2the speciﬁc investment.3 Given that this contract makes the ﬁrst party the residual
claimant she will invest eﬃciently. Admati and Perry (1991) showed two parties can
overcome the free-rider problem by ﬁnancing a public good in stages.
The model presented here develops a simple framework to contrast the simulta-
neous and staged (sequential) investment regimes. The essence of the model is that
staging of the project allows some investment to be made after the point in time
when a contract can be written. Here, the resolution of the incompleteness is facil-
itated by the completion of some aspect of the project. For example, in Grossman
and Hart (1986) contracting became possible after the two parties made their initial
investment. Similarly, Neher (1999) made the point that contracting becomes more
feasible as a project progresses as more of the human capital invested is converted
into physical assets.
The theoretical model incorporates this idea into the following structure. Two
parties are required to make a speciﬁc investment in order to complete a project.
Two distinct alternatives are possible. First, they can invest simultaneously at the
start of the game. If they do so, both invest prior to when contracting is possible.
After both investments are sunk the parties renegotiate and the payoﬀs are realised.
Alternatively, one party can invest ﬁrst while the other party waits. This ﬁrst in-
vestment allows the project to take shape; as a result, contracting on the second
investment becomes possible. At this stage, the parties will renegotiate and write a
contract specifying the second party’s investment. The ﬁnal stage of investment will
3Although the investment may be industry-speciﬁc, it is not relationship-speciﬁc in the traditional
sense. See Malcomson (1997).
3then occur, completing the project and allowing the parties to receive their payoﬀs.
Several important results arise from this simultaneous versus sequential investment
model. First, the paper investigates the relative eﬃciency of the two alternative
investment regimes. When the investments are independent the model identiﬁes three
basic trade-oﬀs between the regimes:
• The sequential system enlarges (relative to simultaneous investments) delay
costs by increasing the length of time before the project matures.
• The sequential system reduces the ﬁrst player’s incentive to invest, vis-a-vis the
simultaneous system, because of the longer time between when his investment
is made and when the returns are realised.
• The sequential system enhances the incentive for the second player to invest
eﬃciently as they do not suﬀer hold-up, which they injure with simultaneous
investments.
The ultimate impact on total surplus is a combination of these trade-oﬀs. We show
that under diﬀerent circumstances either regime of investment maximises welfare.
Moreover, despite the simplicity of the model, no simple relationship between the
welfare eﬀects of the two regimes exists as there is no restriction on how these three
trade-oﬀs interact. However, given that the simultaneous regime encourages the ﬁrst
player to invest, if this player’s contribution is relatively more important than the
other player’s contribution the simultaneous regime is preferred. In the same way,
the sequential regime is preferred when the second investor’s contribution is relatively
4more important, provided both players are suﬃciently patient. Similarly, if a party is
particularly responsive to the incentives provided by one timing regime, that regime
is preferred. For example, when the ﬁrst investor is very responsive to the additional
incentive provided by the simultaneous regime, this timing generates a higher level
of surplus than the alternative. On the other hand, if the second player is very
responsive to the additional incentives to invest provided by the sequential regime,
that timing regime is preferred. These predictions are similar in nature to the property
rights predictions of Hart (1995), although the model is somewhat more general in
that a player may voluntarily forgo the advantages of sequencing of investment (their
property right) in order to encourage the other party to invest more. In this way the
parties can opt for a (more) incomplete contract by choosing to invest simultaneously.
The model is also extended in several other ways, for example by considering these
trade-oﬀs when the two investments are strategic complements and substitutes.
Second, we show that the possibility of investing sequentially does not always
improve welfare. As it turns out, ﬂexibility in the timing of investment can act as
an additional form of hold-up. For want of a better expression we call this kind of
hold-up ‘follow-up’. This occurs when both parties should invest simultaneously at
the start of the project in order to maximise surplus but there is an incentive for one
party to wait until after the other player has sunk their eﬀort before they follow-up
with their own investment.4 Consider the case when technology requires that one
particular party must invest at the commencement of a project but that the other
4‘Follow-up’ can occur in addition to the regular hold-up of investment.
5party can invest either at the same time or wait. The ﬁrst party will anticipate that
the second party will delay their investment - opt for the sequential regime - if it
suits them. The ﬁrst party will then adjust their investment accordingly. In the
extreme this additional form of hold-up will prevent a potential surplus-enhancing
project from proceeding. A similar result arises in the model presented in Smirnov
and Wait (2001).
2 The model
There is a potentially proﬁtable relationship between two parties that, for conve-
nience, we label as a buyer and a seller. Speciﬁcally, if the buyer and seller invest I1
and I2 respectively the two parties share surplus R. The exact relationship between
the investments and surplus is discussed below.
2.1 Timing
The timing of investment is the focus of this paper. Two alternatives are considered.
First, both players invest simultaneously at time t = 1, as shown in Figure 1. At this
stage, contracting on either investment is not possible; consequently renegotiation
will occur after both investments are sunk.5 Deﬁnition 1 reiterates this discussion.
Deﬁnition 1. Simultaneous investment occurs when both parties invest at the same
time, prior to renegotiation.
5The renegotiation process is discussed below.
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Figure 1: Simultaneous investment
Figure 2 outlines the timing of the alternative investment regime. In this regime
the buyer invests I1 at time t = 1 prior to when contracting is possible. However,
this investment makes the contracting process possible, so having observed I1 the
two parties renegotiate and contract on I2. It is only after this that the seller makes
her investment I2. This occurs at time t = 2. After both investments have been
made, surplus is realised and the payoﬀs to each party are made. Deﬁnition 2 deﬁnes
sequential investment.
Deﬁnition 2. Sequential investment occurs when one party (the buyer) invests at
time t = 1, while the other party (the seller) waits and invests at time t = 2.
2.2 Assumptions
As noted above, the investments of the buyer and seller (I1 and I2 ) combine together
to generate surplus R. The investments of both parties are sunk and completely
speciﬁc to the relationship in that they are worth zero outside the relationship. R is
only available at the completion of the project and investment in the relationship is
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Figure 2: Sequential investment
always eﬃcient. Further, it is assumed that each party’s outside option is normalised
to zero.
Although there is complete and symmetric information between the trading par-
ties, the investments are unveriﬁable ex ante. However, as discussed above, once the
buyer’s investment has been sunk the project becomes tangible allowing subsequent
investment to be veriﬁable. On the contrary, the surplus generated by the project is
always unveriﬁable. This prevents the parties writing surplus sharing agreements.
As in Hart and Moore (1988) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), the two parties
cannot vertically integrate to overcome their hold-up problem, due to specialisation,
for example.6
Finally, both the parties discount future returns and costs with a constant discount
factor δ.
When the parties renegotiate they must decide how to split the available surplus.
We adopt a reduced-form bargaining solution in which each party receives one-half
6Williamson (1983) noted that if the parties can vertically integrate they can overcome hold-up
and investment will be eﬃcient.
8of the available surplus.7
3 Simultaneous and sequential investments
This section explores the relative advantage of investing simultaneously or sequen-
tially. Here we assume that total surplus is a function of both investments where
R(I1,I2) is two times diﬀerentiable, non-decreasing in both variables and concave;
that is R0
i = ∂R(I1,I2)/∂Ii ≥ 0, R00
ii = ∂2R(I1,I2)/∂I2





22 − (R12)2 ≥ 0, as summarised by Assumption 1.
Assumption 1. R0
i = ∂R(I1,I2)/∂Ii ≥ 0, R00
ii = ∂2R(I1,I2)/∂I2





22 − (R12)2 ≥ 0 where R12 = ∂2R(I1,I2)/∂I1∂I2.
We consider four diﬀerent possibilities: (1) when investment is simultaneous and
contracts are complete; (2) when investment is simultaneous and contracts are incom-
plete; (3) when investment is sequential and contracts are complete; and (4) sequential
investment when contracts are incomplete. The main emphasis in this paper is on
comparing the relative eﬃciency of (2) and (4).
7This reduced form bargaining solution can be thought of relating to an extensive form bargaining
game, for example Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating bargaining game or the Nash bargaining solution.
For example, see Sutton (1986) and Muthoo (1999, pp. 15-16). Unlike many incomplete-contracts
models the results in this paper are not sensitive to the bargaining solution used.
93.0.1 Simultaneous investment with no renegotiation
If investments are contractible, it is possible to achieve the ﬁrst-best levels of outcome.
If investments are made simultaneously the two parties will maximise
max
I1,I2
δR(I1,I2) − I2 − I1. (1)
Surplus is discounted because the return from investment take one period in which
to mature. The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
R
0




2 = 1/δ. (3)
Assumption 1 guarantees there is a unique solution for both I1 and I2. Let the ﬁrst
best level of investment be denoted as I∗
1 and I∗
2.
3.0.2 Simultaneous investment with renegotiation
Second, when investments are made simultaneously but contracts are incomplete both
parties know that renegotiation will occur. They adjust their investments from the





R(I1,I2) − I1. (4)
10Here, the returns are discounted by δ because they are only available after one period.
Renegotiation occurs after both investments have been sunk; as a consequence each
party anticipates receiving one half of the available surplus. The ﬁrst-order condition













R(I1,I2) − I2, (6)







Let the buyer’s and seller’s choices when investments are set simultaneously and rene-
gotiation occurs to be b I1 and b I2 respectively. These values solve system of equations
4 and 6. The solutions are unique because of Assumption 1.
3.0.3 Sequential investment with complete contracts (no renegotiation)
Alternatively, if investments are made sequentially, the buyer will invest I1 in the ﬁrst
period and the seller will invest I2 in the second period. As contracts are complete




2R(I1,I2) − δI2 − I1. (8)








2 = 1 (10)
so that R
0
1 = 1/δ2 and R
0
2 = 1/δ. Again, Assumption 1 ensures a unique solution for
both investments. Let the ﬁrst best level of investment in this case be I∗∗
1 and I∗∗
2 .
3.0.4 Sequential investment with incomplete contracts (renegotiation)
The ﬁnal case is when the investments are made sequentially and contracts are in-
complete. The buyer invests I1 at time t = 1. Following renegotiation, at time t = 2





[δR(I1,I2) − I2] − I1. (11)






12The seller, who sets her investment level after observing I1 and renegotiating with





[δR(I1,I2) − I2]. (13)







Let the buyer’s and the seller’s levels of investment be e I1 and e I2 when contracts are
made sequentially and contracts are incomplete. These values are the solution to the
system of equations 12 and 14. The solutions are unique because of Assumption 1.
3.1 Timing of investment and total welfare
As it turns out, very little can be said about the trade-oﬀ between simultaneous
and sequential investments when functions are general and contracts are incomplete.
To explore the issue further assume that each investment has no inﬂuence on the







12 = 0, it follows that R = f1(I1)+f2(I2), where f
0
i > 0 and f
00




12 = 0 could arise when an investment by the buyer increases his beneﬁt from trade whereas
investment by the seller reduces her costs. Although they do not aﬀect one another, each investment
increases the potential surplus available to be split upon renegotiation. A similar assumption is made
by Hart and Moore (1988).
13In this framework three separate eﬀects can be isolated that, when combined, give
the relative advantage of either timing regime. First, consider the costs of delay. Let
the total surplus ex ante with simultaneous investment be S2 and the total surplus
ex ante when investment is sequential be S4.9 For two ﬁxed levels of I1 and I2
S2 = δR(I1,I2) − I1 − I2 > δ
2R(I1,I2) − I1 − δI2 = S4. (15)
As sequential investment delays the payoﬀ an extra period, the surplus from simulta-
neous investment is greater than with sequential investments when I1 and I2 are ﬁxed:
the costs of delay always favour simultaneous investment. Further, the relative payoﬀ
of simultaneous investments is increasing as the players become more impatient. This
eﬀect is summarised below.
Eﬀect 1. The costs of delay reduce the surplus generated by sequential investment
relative to the surplus with simultaneous investments.
Second, consider the investment levels generated from each system. Examining
the ﬁrst-order conditions in equations 5 and 12, b R0
1 = 2
δ ≤ e R0
1 = 2
δ2 . Given the
assumption of concavity and monotonicity of R:
b I1 > e I1. (16)
9Both S2 and S4 relate to when contracts are incomplete.
14The sequential investment regime delays the collection of returns to the buyer: this
reduces the incentive for the buyer to invest.10
Eﬀect 2. Relative to the sequential regime, the simultaneous investment regime in-
creases the incentive for the buyer to invest in I1.
For the seller the relative incentives to invest with simultaneous and sequential
investments are given by equations 7 and 14. Again, because of Assumption 1,
b I2 < e I2. (17)
With simultaneous investment the seller is held-up. With sequential investment,
however, the seller invests after renegotiation, thus avoiding any hold-up problems.
In fact, the sequential investment level chosen by the seller equals the ﬁrst-best level,
so that e I2 = I∗∗
2 ; this is the advantage of the sequential regime over simultaneous
investment. Eﬀect 3 summarises this discussion.
Eﬀect 3. The sequential investment regime increases I2 to its ﬁrst-best level.
Eﬀect 2 states that the simultaneous regime increases I1. Eﬀect 3 suggests that the
sequential regime increases I2. To assess the impact of an increase in either investment
on total welfare, isolated from the costs of delay, consider S2 relative to an augmented
S4, termed U4, that has the same discount structure as the simultaneous system. U4




1 = 1/δ, meaning that b I1 < I∗
1 . Similarly, with sequential investment, e R0
1 = 2/δ2 > R
0
1 =
1/δ2, meaning that e I1 < I∗∗
1 .
15ignores the additional discounting of R and of I2 that occurs because of the additional
period. In this case:
S2 = δf1(b I1) − b I1 + δf2(b I2) − b I2. (18)
where the level of investments are determined by equations 5 and 7. Similarly, using
equations 12 and 14
U4 = δf1(e I1) − e I1 + δf2(e I2) − e I2. (19)
The relative incentives to invest for the seller and buyer are summarised in the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma 1. δf1(e I1) − e I1 < δf1(b I1) − b I1, and δf2(e I2) − e I2 > δf2(b I2) − b I2.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Lemma 1 indicates that increasing I1 towards its ﬁrst-best level always increases
the surplus it generates. The same argument applies to I2 . As a consequence of
Lemma 1, we can say that the surplus generated by I1 is greater with the simultaneous
regime. Similarly, the surplus generated by I2 is greater with the sequential regime.
In terms of total surplus, the ultimate trade oﬀ between simultaneous and sequen-
tial systems depends on these three eﬀect: costs of delay incurred with the sequential
regime favour simultaneous investments; delayed returns also amplify hold-up arising
with sequential system and reduce the incentive for the buyer to invest, favouring the
simultaneous system; and, ﬁnally, the sequential system increases the incentive for
the seller to invest, increasing her contribution to total surplus. Two of these eﬀects
work in favour of the simultaneous system and one works in favour of the sequential
16system. Result 1 summarises this discussion.
Result 1. There are three factors that aﬀect the total surplus generated by the si-
multaneous system relative to the total surplus that will be generated by the sequential
system: (Eﬀect 1) costs of delay favour the simultaneous system; (Eﬀect 2) the simul-
taneous regime increases the buyer’s incentive to invest, increasing his contribution
to total surplus; and (Eﬀect 3) the sequential regime increases the seller’s incentive
to invest, relative to the simultaneous regime.
The combined eﬀect of these three eﬀects can be complicated. Note, however,
that the three eﬀects each depend on δ: the costs of delaying the return of surplus
another period directly relate to δ; the level of I1 depends on δ as the two relevant
ﬁrst-order conditions are e R0
1 = 2/δ2 and b R0
1 = 2/δ; and the two ﬁrst-order condition
for the choice of I2 are e R0
2 = 1/δ and b R0
2 = 2/δ. However, if δ = 1 the ﬁrst two of
these eﬀects disappear. The only remaining eﬀect is that sequential investment allows
the seller to avoid being held-up, increasing her incentive to invest. Thus, if δ = 1,
S2 < S4. As R is a continuous function it follows that there is a neighbourhood for δ
close to 1 where the surplus from sequential investment exceeds the surplus generated
with simultaneous investments. This is summarised in the following remark.
Remark 1. There is a small enough ε such that for any δ ∈ (1−ε,1], S2 < S4; that
is, the surplus from sequential investments exceeds that produced with simultaneous
investments.
Example 1. Consider the case when R(I1,I2) = αlnI1 + βlnI2. Figure 3 shows the
four diﬀerent utilities for both simultaneous and sequential investments when contracts
17are both complete and incomplete. 11 First note that U1, the utility when investment
is contractible and simultaneous, and U3, the total utility when both investments are
contractible but made sequentially, are equal when δ = 1 as there are no costs of delay.
Second, consider the surplus generated when contracts are incomplete. U2 represents
the total surplus with simultaneous investment, while U4 represents the total surplus
with the sequential regime. With low values of δ, U2 exceeds U4. However, for values of
δ greater than about 0.9, U4 > U2; that is, the total surplus from sequential investments
exceeds the total surplus with the simultaneous regime.
It is not possible, however, to establish that the relative diﬀerence between the
surplus from sequential and simultaneous investments is monotonically increasing in
δ. With general functions, the relationship between δ, I1 and I2 and total surplus, R
can be complicated.
Remark 2. No monotonic relationship between the surplus from the simultaneous
and sequential systems as δ changes.
11With simultaneous investment and complete contracts the ﬁrst-order conditions are I1
α = I2
β =
1/δ. When contracts are incomplete and investments are simultaneous the ﬁrst-order conditions are
I1
α = I2
β = 2/δ. When investments are sequential and contracts complete: I1
α = 1/δ2 and I2
β =
1/δ. Finally, when investments are sequential and contracts incomplete the ﬁrst-order conditions
are: I1
α = 2/δ2 and I2
β = 1/δ. The speciﬁc functions used assume α = β = 5: that is U1(δ) =
10δ(ln5δ − 1), U2(δ) = 10δ(ln5δ − 0.5 − ln2), U3(δ) = 5δ2(ln5δ2 − 1) + 5δ2(ln5δ − 1) and U4(δ) =







































Figure 3: Illustration to example 1








Here, consider the case when a = 11, b = 10, c = 0.3 and e = 0.7. Using the
explicit solutions to each party’s ﬁrst-order condition, the total utility generated with














































Figure 4 compares these two surpluses. First, there is clearly a non-monotonic re-
lationship between δ and the diﬀerence between S2(δ) and S4(δ). Second, the two
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Figure 4: Illustration to example 2
4 Hold-up and the choice of investment regime
Thus far we have considered the relative merits of the various timing arrangements
in terms of total welfare. The focus shifts here to explore the incentive for the seller,
acting in self-interest, to choose the investment regime that does not maximise total
surplus. Implicit in this discussion is the assumption that the buyer must invest at
the beginning of the project. As a result, only the seller has the opportunity to delay
21her investment and follow-up the buyer.12
There is a trade-oﬀ for the seller when she chooses between the two regimes.
As simultaneous system encourages the buyer to invest, this may allow the seller to
capture more surplus during renegotiation. However, sequential investments allow
the seller herself to invest without the fear of hold-up. The seller will choose the
regime that maximises her welfare. Where her interests diﬀer suﬃciently from the
ﬁrst-best incentives the seller will adopt the ‘wrong’ system, reducing total welfare.
The seller may ﬁnd it in her interests to adopt the sequential system when simul-
taneous investments maximise welfare. She will not, however, adopt a simultaneous
system when the sequential regime maximises welfare. With ineﬃcient simultane-
ous investment the seller will lose out on two fronts: ﬁrst, she will incur hold-up
with simultaneous investments; and second, she will be sharing a lower total surplus.
Consequently, she will never have any incentive to opt for the simultaneous regime
ineﬃciently.
To further investigate the incentives of the seller assume that R12 = 0 and that the
buyer’s level investment is invariant to the seller’s choice of regime.13 Consequently,
I1 can be suppressed, allowing all attention to revolve around the choice about the
timing of I2. The seller will then choose the system (and the level of investment) that
maximises her surplus, regardless of the eﬀect on total welfare.
12See Smirnov and Wait (2001) for a discussion relating to the case when each party can invest
either ﬁrst or last.
13The buyer’s investment may be invariant, for example, because he has extreme beliefs about the
seller’s investment strategy: the buyer could be either naive or pessimistic as to whether the seller
will opt for the simultaneous or sequential regime.
22With simultaneous investments, total welfare can be written as
δ b R − b I2 (24)




b R − b I2. (25)
Denote the seller’s objective function under the simultaneous regime as v1 ; that is,
v1 = δ
2 b R − b I2. This allows the total welfare generated with simultaneous investments
to be written as 2v1 + b I2.
With sequential investments total welfare is
δ
2 e R − δe I2, (26)







Denote the seller’s objective functions under sequential investment as v2 : that is,
v2 = δ2
2 e R− δ
2e I2 . This means that total surplus generated with sequential investments
is 2v2.
Now assume that these potential payoﬀs for the seller are also equal: v1 = v2.
Given that b I2 > 0, simultaneous surplus will be greater than the surplus from se-
23quential investments. It is possible, however, to perturb v2 such that v2 > v1 while
it remains true that simultaneous surplus exceeds the surplus with sequential invest-
ments, as 2v1 + I2 > 2v2. In this case the seller will opt for the sequential regime
even though total surplus is maximised with the simultaneous regime. The above
discussion is summarised in the result below.
Result 2. There exists a range of parameters for which the seller chooses sequential
investments when the simultaneous regime maximises total surplus.
Example 3. Consider the case when R = 10lnI1+8lnI2. Figure 5 plots the surplus of
the seller with diﬀerent investment regimes (on the Y-axis) against δ (on the X-axis).
U22 shows two times the seller’s surplus when investments are made simultaneously.
U4 shows two times the surplus of the seller - this equals the total surplus - when
investments are made sequentially. U2 shows the total surplus of both parties with
simultaneous investments. It can be seen that for δ > 0.8 (approximately) the seller
will opt for the sequential system over the simultaneous option. However, from U2 and
U4 it is only when δ > 0.95 (approximately) that the sequential system produces more
surplus than simultaneous regime. Thus, for δ ∈ (0.8,0.95) the seller opts for the
regime that does not maximise total welfare. Also note, in this example the buyer’s
investment is assumed ﬁxed at b I1 for all of the functions. The speciﬁc functions
used are U2(δ) = δ(10ln5δ + 8ln4δ) − 4δ, U22(δ) = δ(10ln5δ + 8ln4δ) − 8δ and
U4(δ) = δ2(10ln5δ + 8ln8δ) − 8δ.
If the seller opts for the ineﬃcient investment regime the buyer’s share of surplus


































Figure 5: Illustration to example 3
an additional form of hold-up; we term this new form of hold-up ‘follow-up’. In the
extreme the reduction in surplus may lower the buyer’s utility inside the relationship
below his outside option: that is δ
2[δR(e I1, e I2) − e I2] − e I1 < 0. In this case the option
of the sequential regime prevents trade from occurring;14 the inability to commit to
a particular timing regime (the simultaneous regime) hurts the seller as well as the
14Note that provided δ
2R(b I1, b I2)− b I1 > 0, the buyer would have opted into the relationship if only
the simultaneous regime were available.
25buyer.15
5 Extensions
This section makes several extensions to the model presented above. First, we explore
the relationship between the two systems when I1 and I2 are strategic complement
or substitute investments. This allows the relative eﬃciency of each system to be
examined when one player’s investment decision is highly sensitive with respect to
which regime is adopted. Second, the section explores the relative eﬃciency of each
regime when one investment is very important in terms of its contribution to overall
surplus. Third, we examine the situation when one party’s investment is invariant
to the regime adopted. To conclude the section, we investigate the implications for
total welfare when there is a lack of commitment so that either party can trigger
renegotiation at any point in time.
5.1 Strategic substitute and complementary investments
When investment are strategic complements or substitutes R12 6= 0. As this can
signiﬁcantly complicate matters, assume that δ = 1, as summarised in Assumption 3.
Assumption 3. δ = 1
15Similar analysis could be used to show that the sequential regime can create trading possibilities
not available with only the simultaneous regime. For example, the seller may not be willing to invest
simultaneously because the hold-up that occurs during the subsequent renegotiation may leave them
with negative utility. On the other hand, sequential investment gives her the opportunity to delay
their investment until when contracts are complete. This encourages the seller to invest and allows
trade to proceed. This result is similar to the results of other authors, for example Neher (1999)
and Admati and Perry (1991), albeit in a diﬀerent context.
26When Assumption 3 holds the total surplus is
S = R(I1,I2) − I1 − I2 (28)
with both regimes. For the two regimes each player will choose their level of in-
vestment given their respective ﬁrst-order conditions, shown in the Appendix. As
R12 6= 0, an adjustment in one investment will alter the marginal productivity of the
other player’s investment; this will aﬀect each player’s incentive to invest.
If the cross derivative of the investments is positive (R12 > 0) the investments are
strategic complements as an increase in I1 enhances the marginal productivity of I2.
This is summarised in Deﬁnition 3.
Deﬁnition 3. If R12 > 0, I1 and I2 are strategic complements.
Complementary investments may arise between trading parties, for example, when
investment in a particular location enhances the value of the other party’s investment.
Eﬀort in learning about the speciﬁc requirements of the trading partner can also
enhances the productivity of the other player’s investment. Similarly, investing in
machinery or retooling in such a way to ﬁt the requirements of the trading partner
can help increase the marginal product of the other investment.
First, consider the case when investments are simultaneous. As one of the parties
shades their investment, this encourages the other party to also shade their invest-
ment. The overall eﬀect is that both parties reduce their investments even further
below their levels when R12 = 0. This is the familiar underinvestment of the hold-up
27literature when there are externalities.16 As a consequence, when investments are si-
multaneous and the investments are complementary there is underinvestment in both
I1 and I2. This is summarised in Result 3.
Result 3. When the investments are strategic complements and made simultaneously,
there is underinvestment in both I1 and I2.
Now consider when R12 < 0.
Deﬁnition 4. If R12 < 0, I1 and I2 are strategic substitutes.
An example of strategic substitute investments is when the two parties both re-
quire the use of a third asset, such as a particular location or venue, the supply of
which is ﬁxed or severely limited.17 In this case, the buyer using the asset reduces
the seller’s return on any investment because their use of the asset is subsequently
limited.
It is shown in the Appendix that the overall impact on I1 and I2 is ambiguous when
investments are made simultaneously. For example, if the seller shades her investment
the buyer has an incentive to increase I1. Provided that the substitutability of the
investments, as measured by the absolute size of R
00
12, exceeds the eﬀect of diminishing
returns to investment, as measured by the absolute value of R
00
22, the buyer will have
an incentive to increase his investment above the ﬁrst-best level. Similarly, there can
be over-investment in I2 provided the substitutability of the investments outweighs
16For example, see De Fraja (1999).
17Another example could be a negative externality between the parties. See, for example, Pitchford
and Snyder (1999). Alternatively, if the two parties both produce a byproduct or pollutant, the
output of which is limited by government regulation, an increase in output by one party limits the
permissible output by the other.





follows from the assumption of concavity, however, that there will be underinvestment
in at least one of the investments, even if there is over-investment in one of the
investments.18 The above discussion is summarised in the following result.
Result 4. When the investments are substitutes and made simultaneously there can
be under or over-investment in I1 and I2, however, there will be underinvestment in
at least one of the investments.
Now consider when investments are made sequentially. The buyer will underinvest
regardless as to whether the investments are strategic complements or substitutes, as
was the case when R12 = 0. In regards to I2, when the investments are strategic
complements the seller also underinvests.19 This is because, unlike when R12 = 0, the
underinvestment in I1 reduces the incentive for the seller to invest in I2.
In contrast, when the investments are substitutes the underinvestment in I1 by
the buyer provides an incentive to the seller to overinvest in I2 . The following result
summarises the above discussion.
Result 5. When investment is sequential, there is underinvestment in I1. When
investments are strategic complements there is also underinvestment I2, while if in-
vestments are strategic substitutes there is overinvestment in I2.
This subsection has explored the situation when investment by one party aﬀects
the marginal productivity of the other’s investment, either in a negative or positive
18For details see the Appendix.
19Note that when R12 = 0 the sequential regime encouraged the seller to set I2 at the ﬁrst-best
level.
29manner. It was shown previously that when R12 = 0 the relative welfare of the
two systems depended on the interaction of three eﬀects. When the investments are
either complements or substitutes these three eﬀects are complicated somewhat by
the impact each investment can have on the other investor’s incentives. The next
subsection extends this analysis further, notably by relaxing the assumption that
δ = 1.
5.2 Substitutes and complements with hyper-incentives
To further explore this issue consider the following speciﬁc functional form:
R = f1(I1) + f2(I2) + εI1I2 (29)
such that total surplus with simultaneous investment is
δR − I2 − I1 (30)
and total surplus with sequential investment is
δ
2R − I1 − δI2. (31)
With this function, when ε < 0 the investments are strategic substitutes and when
ε > 0 they are strategic complements.













− εb I1. (33)












− εe I1. (35)
If |ε| is small the complementarity or substitutability between I1 and I2 will be
outweighed by eﬀects 1, 2 and 3, outlined when the investments are independent
(ε = 0). As the impact of ε is relatively small it remains the case that b I1 > e I1 and
b I2 < e I2, in a similar manner as to when R12 = 0. Further, there are the same welfare
trade-oﬀs between the regimes, namely that simultaneous investment increases the
contribution to total welfare from I1 while the surplus generated by I2 is enhanced
with sequential investment. Note that, however, when R12 6= 0 the sequential regime
will merely encourage the seller to invest at the surplus maximising level given the
buyer’s investment; this will not necessarily be the ﬁrst-best level. This discussion is
summarised in the following remark.
31Remark 3. When R = f1(I1) + f2(I2) + εI1I2, provided the investments are not
strong strategic complements or substitutes the same three eﬀects outlined in Result
1 determine the relative welfare of the simultaneous and sequential regimes. Note,
the directions of these three eﬀects remain unchanged, although the values may be
diﬀerent.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
When |ε| is large the eﬀects arising from the interaction between investments can
lead to other possibilities. For example, if ε > 0 it is possible for the any one of the
relevant ﬁrst-order conditions to be less than zero. This provides that party with
the incentive to invest ∞; given the complementarity between investments, the other
party will also invest ∞, and the ﬁrst-best will be achieved (ignoring the costs of
delay). Another interpretation is that the ﬁrst party will invest as much as they
can, given their budget constraint. Again, this will encourage the other party to
increase their investment. When a party’s derivative is negative, this produces a
‘hyper-incentive’ for that party to invest. This term is deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 5. A hyper-incentive is created when the ﬁrst-order condition for a party
is negative.
Interestingly, one regime may produce a negative ﬁrst-order condition while the
other may not. For example, the simultaneous regime may produce a negative ﬁrst-
order condition for the buyer while the sequential system remains positive. In this
case, the simultaneous regime produces a hyper-incentive for the buyer to invest -
this means that this regime is favoured over the alternative. On the other hand,
32the sequential regime may produce a hyper-incentive for the seller, while her ﬁrst-
order condition with the simultaneous may still be positive. It is not the case that
the sequential regime is always preferred, however, as the sequential regime involves
additional costs of delay. For sequential investment to be favoured these costs of delay
must be outweighed by the extra surplus generated from the hyper-incentive. The
above discussion is summarised in the following result.
Result 6. When the simultaneous regime creates a hyper-incentive for the buyer
it is favoured over the sequential regime. When sequential investments generates a
hyper-incentive for the seller it is favoured over the simultaneous investment regime,
provided the players are suﬃciently patient.
Of course, when both systems generate hyper-incentives for a particular party
simultaneous investment is preferred as it avoids some costs of delay.
In this subsection we have relaxed the assumption that δ = 1 when the investments
are either complements or substitutes. When the complementarity or substitutability
between I1 and I2 is suﬃciently small the same welfare trade-oﬀs apply as when
R12 = 0: the simultaneous regime encourages investment in I1 and lowers costs
of delay while the sequential regime encourages investment in I2. With signiﬁcant
interaction between the investments the matter is further complicated so that other
outcomes are possible.
335.3 Important investments and timing
From eﬀects 2 and 3 above, sequential investments favour I2 while simultaneous in-
vestments favour I1. As a consequence, when I1 is very important relative to I2 the
simultaneous investment system is preferred over sequential investments. Using simi-
lar reasoning, when I2 is very important relative to the unimportant I1 the sequential
system is favoured over the simultaneous investment system.
To see this, we adopt a variant of Hart’s (1995) deﬁnition of an unimportant
investment.20 For simplicity we assume f1(0) = f2(0) = 0.
Deﬁnition 6. I1 is unimportant if: R(e I1,I2) = δ2f1(e I1)+δ2f2(I2)−e I1−δI2 is close to
R(0,I2) = δ2f2(I2)−δI2; and R(b I1,I2) = δf1(b I1)+δf2(I2)−b I1−I2 is close to R(0,I2) =
δf2(I2)−I2. Similarly, I2 is unimportant if: R(I1, e I2) = δ2f1(I1)+δ2f2(e I2)−I1 −δe I2
is close to R(I1,0) = δ2f1(I1)−I1; and R(I1, b I2) = δf1(I1)+δf2(b I2)−I1 − b I2 is close
to R(I1,0) = δf1(I1) − I1.
The key element here is that when a particular investment is unimportant it
contributes relatively little to total surplus, although the marginal incentive to invest
for the relevant player is unchanged.21 The term ‘close to’ in Deﬁnition 6 can be
considered as equivalent to the statement that A is close to B iﬀ A  A − B.
First consider when I2 is unimportant. Using the deﬁnition above, if I2 is unim-
portant total surplus with simultaneous investment, δf1(I1) + δf2(I2) − I1 − I2, can
20See Hart (1995), p. 44.




δ for i = 1,2. With sequential investments the ﬁrst-order condition
for the buyer is f
0
1(I1) = 2





δf1(I1) − I1. (36)
As a result all that matters to overall welfare is I1. Surplus is then maximised by the
system that promotes the highest level of I1. As noted above, the level of I1 with
simultaneous investments, b I1, is closer to the ﬁrst-best level than e I1. Following from
Deﬁnition 6:
R(b I1, b I2) ∼ = δf(b I1) − b I1 > R(e I1, e I2) ∼ = δ
2f(e I1) − e I1. (37)
A similar argument can be made when I1 is unimportant. In this case the sequen-
tial regime provides the seller with greater incentive to invest eﬃciently. There is,
however, additional costs of delay with the sequential regime as compared with the
simultaneous regime. The sequential regime will only be preferred if the beneﬁts from
the seller’s additional investment outweigh these delay costs. From Deﬁnition 6 the
total surplus with simultaneous investments is δf(b I2) − b I2, whereas the total surplus
with sequential investments is given by δ2f(e I2)−δe I2. The following result summarises
this discussion.
Result 7. When I2 is unimportant the simultaneous investment system maximises
total welfare. When I1 is unimportant either regime may maximise total welfare.
This result parallels Proposition 2(B) in Hart (1995). Hart argued that when one
investment was unproductive asset ownership would be organised as to give the other
party as much incentive to invest as possible. The model presented here suggests
that when one investment is relatively unimportant the timing of investment should
35provide as much incentive as possible to the other party (ignoring the costs of delay).
As in Hart (1995) there is no need to worry about the loss of surplus from reducing
the other player’s investment because it contributes relatively little to investment.
5.4 Inelastic investments
A party’s level of investment may be invariant to the timing regime adopted. This
may result, for example, because of a binding wealth constraint. This inelasticity can
be utilised by concentrating on maximising the incentive for the other party to invest.
To facilitate the discussion consider the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 7. The buyer’s (seller’s) investment decision is inelastic when his (her)
level of investment I1 (I2) is the same for both the simultaneous and the sequential
regimes.
Deﬁnition 7 is the analogue of Deﬁnition 1 in Hart (1995, p. 44).
If the buyer will invest I1 with either regimes, the sequential regime enhances the
seller’s incentive to invest. There is, however, an additional cost of delay. In terms
of maximising welfare, these two factors work against each other. As a result, either
regime could maximise welfare when the buyer’s investment is inelastic. Alternatively,
when the seller’s investment is inelastic - that is, she always invests I2 regardless of
the regime adopted - the simultaneous regime both encourages greater investment
by the buyer and reduces the cost of delay. In this case the simultaneous regime is
unambiguously superior. This discussion is summarised in the following result.
Result 8. When the buyer’s investment is inelastic there is an ambiguous relationship
36between regime type and total welfare. If the seller’s investment is inelastic, the
simultaneous regime unambiguously superior maximises total surplus.
This result is similar to Proposition 2(A) in Hart (1995, p. 45). There, if one
party’s incentive to invest is invariant to asset ownership the other party should own
the assets in order to encourage more eﬃcient investment. Similarly here, when
one party’s incentive to invest is inelastic to the regime adopted, the regime chosen
should maximise the incentive for the other party to invest. The only complication
here is that the cost of delay also need to be taken into account. For example, if
the generation of additional surplus from more eﬃcient investment by the seller with
the sequential regime does not outweigh the costs of delay, the simultaneous system
should still be adopted.
5.5 Renegotiation
Hart and Moore (1999) assumed it was not possible for trading parties to make a
credible commitment not to renegotiate. Grout (1984) also noted that industrial
relations contracts are often not binding. Similarly, in an ‘at-will’ contracting envi-
ronment either party can unilaterally trigger renegotiation or terminate the contract
if they wish.22 In this section we assume that either party can trigger renegotiation
at any point in time.
22See the discussion of ‘at-will’ contracts in Malcomson (1997). The contracts in this subsection
are slightly diﬀerent from a typical ‘at-will’ contract environment. Usually in an ‘at-will’ environment
there is an asymmetry in the bargaining power between the buyer and the seller. For example, if
the buyer (ﬁrm) starts negotiations and proposes a new lower price, the seller (worker) is taken to
have accepted this new proposed contract if she continues to supply her services (labour). On the
other hand, if the seller attempts to raise price the default price takes precedence, unless the buyer
explicitly accepts the new contract.
37When this is the case, only the ﬁnal renegotiation aﬀects the distribution of surplus
(and hence the incentive to invest). The last opportunity to renegotiate occurs after
the last investment has been made, that is, once I2 has been completed. Renegotiation
will always occur at this stage because the buyer is better oﬀ with a new distribution
of surplus after I2 is sunk.
First, consider when investment is simultaneous. As before, renegotiation will
occur after both investments have been made. Consequently, the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions for both players are the same as described above. With sequential investment
renegotiation will always occur after the seller has invested. As both investments are




[R(I1,I2)] − I1. (38)






which is unchanged from when there is no subsequent renegotiation. Label the level of
the buyer’s investment when commitment is not possible with sequential investment
as e e I1. From this it can be seen that
e e I1 = e I1 < b I1. (40)
38On the other hand, the seller will maximise:
δ2
2
[R(I1,I2)] − δI2 (41)







Label the seller’s choice of her investment when commitment is not possible at any
stage and investment is sequential as e e I2. Comparing the ﬁrst-order condition for
the seller when there is simultaneous investment (R
0
2 = 2
δ) and when investment is
sequential but there is no after-investment renegotiation (R
0
2 = 1
δ) it can be seen that
e e I2 = b I2 < e I2. (43)
If there is ex post renegotiation it does not matter that the investments were initially
made sequentially as both parties suﬀer from hold-up. As the buyer is always held-
up, assuming R
00
12 = 0, his incentive to invest is unchanged from the usual sequential
regime discussed above. Now, however, any potential advantage of the sequential
regime is eliminated: the seller also suﬀers from hold-up with the sequential regime
reducing her incentive to invest. As the sequential system involves more costs of de-
lay, the simultaneous system produces higher total surplus than the sequential regime.
Consequently, if commitment is not possible, simultaneous investment is strictly pre-
39ferred to sequential investment. Moreover the ability of either party to trigger rene-
gotiation at any time eﬀectively renders the possibility of sequential investment (or
its attractiveness) redundant. This is summarised in the following result.
Result 9. If the parties cannot commit not to renegotiate after both investments have
been made, the simultaneous system strictly dominates sequential investment for δ < 1
in terms of total welfare as well as welfare of the seller. Consequently, if the parties
are unable to commit not to renegotiate, the sequential regime is never adopted.
This lack of commitment may be advantageous, however, if the seller would like
to commit not to adopt the sequential regime, as it provides the buyer with a lower
level of surplus than his outside option (as discussed in section 4). The knowledge
that the buyer will trigger renegotiation acts as a credible commitment by the seller
to invest simultaneously. This may in turn encourage the buyer to invest.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a model in which two parties can invest in a mutually beneﬁcial
project at the same time (simultaneous investment) or they can choose to invest one
after the other (sequential investment). It is assumed that contracting on any future
investment becomes possible after some investment has been made as it allows the
project to become more clearly deﬁned. Consequently, the advantage of the sequenc-
ing of investments is it allows the party that has delayed making their investment to
avoid being held-up. The disadvantage of staging is that it reduces the incentive to
40invest of the ﬁrst-mover. This can also have feed-back eﬀects on the second party’s
investment depending on the relationship between the two investments. In addition,
sequencing of investment lengthens the time from the start of the project until the
returns are realised, reducing the ex ante value of total surplus when parties discount
future returns. The relative advantage of the sequential versus the simultaneous in-
vestment regime depends on the precise nature of these trade-oﬀs. Two principles
apply, however, provided the parties are suﬃciently patient: ﬁrst, the regime that
favours the most important investment in terms of its contribution to total surplus
is preferred; and, second, if one investment is invariant to the regime adopted, the
optimal timing of investment will be the regime that maximises the incentive for the
other party to invest.
Much of the emphasis in the existing literature has focused on how staging invest-
ments can improve welfare when there are incomplete contracts or when parties are
unable to commit. In the model presented in this paper it is demonstrated that, in
some cases, the option of sequencing investments can reduce welfare. It is shown that
under certain conditions a party will opportunistically opt for the sequential regime,
reducing total surplus. We interpret this possibility as a new form of hold-up and
term it ‘follow-up’.
7 Appendix
Lemma 1 δf1(e I1) − e I1 < δf1(b I1) − b I1, and δf2(e I2) − e I2 > δf2(b I2) − b I2.




δ. This level of investment is termed I∗







1 (I1) ≤ 0. For I1 < I∗
1, [δf1(I1) − I1]0 ≥ 0, hence δf1(I1) − I1 is a non-decreasing
function ∀ I1 ∈ [0,I∗
1), which means δf1(e I1) − e I1 < δf1(b I1) − b I1. A similar argument
applies to I2. 
Result 3 When the investments are complements and made simultaneously, there is
underinvestment in both I1 and I2.
Proof. When Assumption 3 holds the total surplus is
S = R(I1,I2) − I1 − I2 (44)




1 = 2 (45)
b R
0
2 = 2 (46)
for the simultaneous investment system, and
e R
0
1 = 2 (47)
e R
0
1 = 1 (48)
with sequential investments.




1 = a (49)
b R
0
2 = a (50)
for the simultaneous investment equations, and
e R
0
1 = a (51)
e R
0
1 = 1 (52)
for the sequential system. This allows the buyer and seller’s investment levels to be
represented as functions of a: from equations 49 and 50 the relevant investment levels
become b I1(a) and b I2(a); and from equations 51 and 52 e I1(a) and e I2(a) are the relevant
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43Note that given the assumption of concavity the denominator is always negative.
When R12 > 0,
b I
0
1(a) < 0 (57)
b I
0
2(a) < 0. (58)
The overall eﬀect of moving from the ﬁrst-best level of investment (when R
0
i = 1) to
the second best solutions given by equations 45 and 46, must consider the integral
of the marginal changes over the entire range of a ∈ [1,2]. However, as the marginal
change is always of the same sign we can discern that when the investments are
complements there is underinvestment of both investments. 
Result 4 When the investments are substitutes and made simultaneously there can
be under or overinvestment in I1 and I2, however, there will be underinvestment
in at least one of the investments.
Proof. From equations 55 and 56, when R12 < 0,
b I
0
1(a) ≷ 0 (59)
b I
0
2(a) ≷ 0. (60)




22 |. Likewise, the derivative for I2 is























12)2 < 0. This suggests that there will be underinvestment
44in at least one of the investments, even if there is over-investment in one of the
investments. 
Result 5 When investment is sequential, there is underinvestment in I1. When in-
vestments are complements there is also underinvestment I2 while if investments
are substitutes there is overinvestment in I2.
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Regardless of the sign of R12,
e I
0
1 < 0. (65)
This indicates that there will be underinvestment in I1.
For I2, when the investments are complements - that is when R
00
12 > 0 - there is
underinvestment in I2 as
e I
0






2 > 0 (67)
indicating that there will be over-investment in I2. 
Remark 3 When R = f1(I1) + f2(I2) + εI1I2, provided the investments are not
strong complements or substitutes the same three eﬀects outlined in section 3
determine the relative welfare of the simultaneous and sequential regimes. Note,
the directions of these three eﬀects remain unchanged, although the values may
be diﬀerent.
Proof. Let us consider the following parameterised ﬁrst-order conditions
f
0
1(I1) = a − εI2 and f
0
2(I2) = b − εI1. (68)










= b − εI1. (69)


















1(·) − ε2 < 0. (71)
46Similarly when a = constant and b = b(I1) diﬀerentiating of equation 69 with








0 − ε, (72)











When |ε| is small the eﬀect outlined in equation 73 can be ignored. Consequently,
equation 71 has the dominant eﬀect. From this we know that I1 is higher with si-
multaneous investment than with the sequential regime, and that I1 is greater still
with complete contracts (ﬁrst-best I1). Further, in a similar manner as outlined in
Lemma 1, higher levels of I1 translate to a greater contribution to total surplus. We
can rank the regimes in terms of the contribution I1 makes to welfare: the simulta-
neous regime dominates the sequential regime.










= a − εI2. (74)
Diﬀerentiating this equation with respect to I1 when: b = constant and a = a(I1);





















1(·) − ε2 < 0 (76)
respectively.
In a similar manner as described with I1 above, when |ε| is small the eﬀect outlined
in equation 76 has the dominant inﬂuence on I2. This suggests I2 is greater with the
sequential regime than with simultaneous investments, although it is still lower than
its ﬁrst-best level. The levels of I2 also directly translate into its contribution to total
welfare: I2 contributes more to total welfare with sequential investment than with
the simultaneous regime. 
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